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CUSTOM, CLASS, AND TI-IE "INFORMAL" SECTOR: 
or, WHY MARGINALITY IS NOT LIKELY 1D PAY .. 
By Sara S. Berry 
The economic vitality of small-scale enterprise is not a new theme in 
the literature on African economic development. Twenty-five years ago, 
P. T. Bauer (1952) wrote a spirited defense of anglophone West Africa's 
atomistic competitors; ten years later, Polly Hill (1963) discovered the 
capitalist propensities of Ghanaian cocoa farmers; and the ensuing decade 
was devoted to celebrating the economic acumen and enthusiasm of West 
African entrepreneurs (Hogendorn, 1975; Hopkins, 1973; Miracle, 1967). 
Even in East and Central Africa, where colonial policy tended to discrim-
inate against small- as well as large-scale African entrepreneurs, scholars 
began in the 1960s to document the economic resourcefulness of indigenous 
producers (Dean, 1965; Baldwin, 1966; Elkan, 1960; Marris and Somerset, 
1971). 
Bauer's study focused primarily on traders--the ubiquitous middlemen 
and -women of West African economic life--who were usually condemned by 
African farmers and colonial officials alike for profiteering at the expense of 
the producer. He argued that without the commercial, financial, and trans-
port services provided by African traders, most of the export-led growth 
which occurred during the colonial period would not have taken place. He also 
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maintained that competitive pressures served to minimize excess profits in the 
commercial sector, and hence that the establishment of government monopolies 
in the export trade, in the form of statutory marketing boards, was a retrogres-
sive step. Economic historians have, on the whole, accepted Bauer's thesis 
that the indigenous commercial sector has played a vital role in facilitating both 
African participation in international trade and in the growth of internal produc-
tion and exchange, although they have adduced plenty of evidence of monopoly 
power among African merchants at various times and places that raises questions 
about their economic efficiency (see, for example, Hopkins, 1973). 
Economists of the neoclassical tradition who study contemporary African en-
terprise have, on the other hand, focused primarily on manufacturing and artisanry 
rather than trade, in what amounts to a tacit acceptance of the Marxist dictum that 
production creates value but exchange does not. When trade is mentioned at all, 
it tends to be dismissed as "redistributive" (Steel), despite the fact that one of the 
most frequently cited constraints on increased output and incomes of small-scale 
producers is inadequate marketing facilities. The following summary of evidence 
and conclusions from this body of literature relates, therefore, primarily to small-
scale manufacturing and related services such as repair. 
In general, one can distinguish two cohorts in the recent literature on small-
scale enterprise in Africa. The first includes studies by Kilby (1965 and 1969), 
Harris and Rowe (1966), Nafziger (1969) and Marris and Somerset, which were 
mostly carried out in the 1960s and which approached the study of small-scale 
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enterprise from a dynamic point of view. Reflecting the then prevailing emphasis 
on industrialization as the essence of economic development, these authors not 
only focused on manufacturing, but also sought to identify the sources of entrepre-
neurship in African economies and to estimate the capacity for growth of indige-
nous enterprise. Accordingly they collected evidence on the socioeconomic back-
ground of the entrepreneurs themselves and on the economic performance of their 
firms over time. 
Most of these studies concluded that African entrepreneurs were dynamic but 
inefficient: quick to perceive and act on changing market opportunities, but less 
successful in managing either the productive or the financial aspects of their busi -
nesses in a consistently effective manner. The authors found much evidence of 
waste, idle capacity, and poor financial management, which also appeared to in-
crease with the size of the firm. In other words, there appeared to be limits both 
on the scale of production which African entrepreneurs could handle efficiently and 
on the potential contribution of indigenous enterprise to economic growth. Expla-
nations of these limits varied: writers on East Africa tended to emphasize systemic 
constraints on Africans' access to capital and skills and official indifference to 
small business (Marris and Somerset, 1971), while studies of West Africa con-
centrated on the educational, experiential, or cultural deficiencies of the entre-
preneurs themselves (I will come back to this point below). 
In the 1970s, the aims of nonsocialist development strategy have been reformu-
lated somewhat: hothouse schemes for import-substituting industrialization have 
been shown to intensify some of the problems they were designed to alleviate- -
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for example, agricultural stagnation, balance of payments deficits, unemployment 
and inequality--and students of economic development have shifted their attention 
from an exclusive concern with growth to emphasize the equal importance of em-
ployment and equality (see, for example, Healey, 1972). 1n the process, econo-
mists have rediscovered small-scale enterprise. Beginning with the ILO report 
(1973) on employment, incomes and equality in Kenya, several recent studies 
have argued that not only does small-scale enterprise tend to employ relatively 
labor-intensive technology and therefore to offer greater scope for absorbing 
"surplus labor," especially in the cities, than do large capital-intensive estab-
lishments, but also that small firms typically obtain higher returns to scarce 
resources and hence more nearly maximize output from available inputs (ILO, 
1973; Liedholm and Chuta, 1976; Steel, forthcoming; Child, 1973). They con-
clude that a policy of promoting small-scale enterprise need not entail a sacrifice 
of output for employment (and/or equality) because the two goals are complemen-
tary. Indeed, aid to small business is recommended as an optimal strategy for 
African governments who seek economic growth with full employment. 
In a celebrated critique of the ILO report on Kenya, Colin Leys (1974) argued 
that their conclusions were politically naive and economically misleading. On the 
one hand, he pointed out that since politicians and administrators have been some 
of the chief beneficiaries of past development policies which have favored large-
scale, capital-intensive industrial and commercial establishments, it is unreal-
istic to expect them to restructure development policies in a way which counter-
acts their class interests. On the other, he maintains that even a policy to -··" 
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promote increased production in the informal sector would serve only to ensure 
a continuing supply of cheap wage goods to the capitalist sector--not to increase 
the economic well-being of the urban masses. 
Leys' argument that the Kenyan bourgeoisie is not likely to tax itself to sub-
sidize the urban poor is convincingly supported by his analysis of the class basis 
of Kenya's political system. He does not, however, give a clear economic expla-
nation for his assertion that incentives for the informal sector, even if forthcoming, 
would do no good. In the following discussion I will reexamine the issue of the 
development potential of the informal sector by considering 1) possible reasons 
for the inconsistency between demonstrations of the economic efficiency of small-
scale firms and earlier studies which criticized African managerial performance; 
and 2) the changing position of the "informal" sector in the process of contem-
porary African economic development. In conclusion, I touch briefly on the im-
plications of my analysis for Leys' argument that only revolutionary political 
action by the lower classes will significantly alter their chances of increased 
economic well-being in the long run. 
To the extent that the informal sector has expanded in aggregate terms, it 
now seems clear that this has been largely due to increased domestic demand for 
inexpensive final and intermediate goods. Liedholm and Chuta argue emphatically 
for a consumptionist model of nonagricultural growth in Sierra Leone. Tuey show 
that demand for a variety of nonagricultural commodities and services is rela-
tively income-elastic and hence that growth of rural income is a major source of 
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increased opportunity for small-scale enterprise (pp. 60-61). Similarly, in my 
own research in the cocoa farming areas of Western Nigeria, I found that the in-
cidence of nonagricultural employment in rural areas was positively associated 
with the growth of agricultural income over time (Berry, 1975). 
Most of the growth of nonagricultural output and employment resulting from 
increased domestic demand has, however, occurred through the proliferation of 
very small enterprises, rather than through the expansion of individual firms. 
The great majority of nonagricultural enterprises in most African countries con-
sists of single proprietors who employ simple hand tools and at most a couple of 
apprentices (Koll, 1968; L&C, 1976; Kilby, 1969; Aluko, 1973; ILO, 1973). In-
comes are very low and there may be a considerable element of underemployment--
in the sense of the Hausa term aikinbanza ( =useless work)--in this sector, 
Indeed, open unemployment is something of a luxury, found primarily among young 
school leavers whose families can afford to support them while they search for 
remunerative jobs (Harris and Sabot, 1976). Low aggregate rates of open unem-
ployment in African cities are more a reflection of pervasive poverty than of 
economic progress (Turnham, 1970). 
The proliferation of tiny firms does not automatically imply a significant 
potential for development, demonstrations of their economic efficiency notwith-
standing. Such demonstrations are usually based on static, neoclassical produc-
tion function analysis which, apart from the methodological ambiguities involved 
in testing static efficiency, shows only that producers are making the best of 
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their present situation. It provides no basis for evaluating that situation or for 
predicting how producers would behave if conditions changed. The fact that 
single craftsmen do not waste time or materials in their efforts to scrape to-
gether a meager living does not mean they would be equally efficient if their 
businesses expanded tenfold. Indeed, studies of intermediate sized firms have 
shown that expansion is often accompanied by a deterioration in managerial per-
formance (Harris, 1968; Harris and Rowe, 1966; Kilby, 1969; Marris and 
Somerset, 1971). 
Studies of African entrepreneurship which were carried out in the 1960s 
sought to identify some of the major constraints on the expansion of small-scale 
firms. In reviewing their findings, it is useful to begin with the literature on in-
digenous entrepreneurship in Nigeria, because of the relative absence there of 
governmental restrictions on small-scale industry. This is not to deny the sig-
nificance of "governmental discrimination" as a constraint on the expansion of 
small-scale industries in many African countries; rather, I shall attempt to 
clarify the impact of official constraints by considering them separately from 
nonofficial ones. 
The relative "openness" of the Nigerian economy in the 1950s and 1960s 
led Kilby, Harris, and others to attribute the instability and inefficiency of 
small- and medium-sized Nigerian firms to the inferior quality of management 
provided by most Nigerian entrepreneurs. By this they meant not that Nigerian 
entrepreneurs were not responsive to market opportunities--on the contrary--
8/ 
but that there were serious deficiencies in plant layout, supervision of labor, and 
control of production in many Nigerian firms, and also a tendency to use profits 
for consumption or to undertake unprofitable because unmanageable patterns of 
portfolio diversification, rather than to plough them back into the original busi -
ness. They then attempted to explain the quality of indigenous management by 
correlating business size and performance with various indicators of entrepre-
neurs' sociocultural experience: education (both schooling and on-the-job training), 
ethnicity, socioeconomic background, extended family obligation, etc. The re-
sults of such empirical tests were not terribly conclusive and different authors 
offered different explanations for them. Join Harris argued, for example, that 
Nigerian entrepreneurs' chief handicap was their lack of training in managerial 
skills--a deficiency which could, presumably, be remedied through appropriate 
government action. Peter Kilby, on the other hand, reached the more pessimistic 
conclusion that 
the roots of entrepreneurial deficiencies that have been 
described may run deeper than mere lack of experience 
and training. . . . In brief, what is being suggested here 
is that the development of certain requisite entrepre-
neurial characterisitics, relating to performance in the 
organizational and technological spheres, is being im-
peded by traditional socio-cultural factors common to 
all of Nigeria's ethnic groups (p. 341). 
Neither Kilby nor Harris (nor any other economist writing on the subject) 
offered a clearly articulated theory of the ways in which sociocultural variables 
interact with economic conditions to affect managerial performance. Socio-
cultural "factors" such as kinship or ethnicity were treated either as potential 
9/ 
"obstacles" to efficiency and investment or, at best, as a kind of low-level in-
surance mechanism to which urban immigrants in general and small-scale entre-
preneurs in particular tended to cling in the absence of any national pension or 
employment insurance schemes. These views are shared by a great many 
students of African economies (including men of such widely divergent views as 
Michael Todaro and Samir Amin) and frequently serve as a basis for the design 
of development strategy (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Amin, 1972, 1973). 
However, research on urban wage earners--particularly those employed in 
the public or large-scale private sector- -has produced some evidence to suggest 
that the great attraction of formal sector employment in Africa is not so much 
higher incomes--real per capita incomes of unskilled labor in the formal sector 
are often not much higher than those earned in the rural or informal urban sec-
tors--but job security (Peil, 1972; Pfefferman, 1968; Hart, 1973). Such evidence 
is hardly consistent with the view that extended family, village or ethnic affilia-
tions provide security which enables urban immigrants to gamble in the risky but 
rewarding lottery of the urban job market. On the contrary, it suggests that 
many people seek formal sector jobs to escape the insecurity of self-employment 
in the rural or informal urban sectors. 
Why then do African entrepreneurs continue to employ and/or subsidize their 
kinsmen, to the detriment of the efficiency and/or expansion of their firms? To 
answer this, I think it is necessary to drop the notion that so-called noneconomic 
institutions are simply obstacles to entrepreneurial success. My essential 
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premise is that, in any society, acquisition and deployment of productive re-
sources and uses of the resulting income are economic processes which are 
governed by (and, in turn, help to shape) a complex set of interacting institutions 
and social relationships. Since the particular configuration of institutions and 
their effects on economic activity vary from one historical situation to another, 
it is necessary to treat institutions as variables rather than as parameters in 
analyzing economic behavior. Rather than assume, for example, that the insti-
tutions of "firm" and "household" perform the same economic roles in African 
economies as they do in Western ones, we might begin with individuals as eco-
nomic actors and then ask how their access to and use of economic resources is 
affected by their participation in a variety of institutional relationships or 
settings, including marriage, residential units, genealogical groupings, communi-
ties, work places, unions, political parties, ethnic associations, etc. (This 
approach, it should be emphasized, is a methodological suggestion for clarifying 
our understanding both of individual behavior and of social change: it does not re-
flect a causal premise that individuals originate or control historical processes. ) 
I think that the methodological approach just suggested may help to clarify 
some of the existing confusion about a) the managerial quality or performance of 
small-scale enterprise in Africa, and b) the relationship between entrepreneurial 
performance on the micro-level, and macro-level processes of economic growth, 
distribution, and structural change. On the micro-level, some of the most use-
ful insights into the managerial strategies of African entrepreneurs have been 
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offered by social anthropologists who, whatever the limitations of their economic 
analysis, nevertheless do examine entrepreneurial activity in its social context. 
I shall again draw primarily on studies of small firms in Nigeria to illustrate my 
points--in this case because the Nigerian literature is particularly rich in this 
area. 
In the Literature on small-scale enterprise in Nigeria, we can discern two 
patterns of interaction between "noneconomic" institutions and the economic per-
formance of small business. First, entrepreneurs' perception of their economic 
options are influenced by their social circumstances. Archibald Callaway (1973) 
found, for example, that his informants did not perceive their obligations to kins-
men as obstacles to business success. On the contrary, "help to relatives is 
frequently thoughtof as a form of repayment for previous aid" (p. 44. Cf. 
Garlick, 1971). He goes on to suggest that 
many businessmen, particularly those at the lower eco-
nomic levels, do not perceive this conflict between using 
money for family expenses or as capital for expanding 
their businesses because their priorities are family first 
and business second. They might well, in fact, turn the 
idea around and say that the low income from their busi -
ness keeps their family from getting ahead (particularly 
in education) (p. 37). 
Similarly, proprietors did not expect their firms to outlive themselves: survival 
of the firm as a permanent institution was not one of their primary goals. 
Although Callaway interprets his survey data as evidence of small-scale 
entrepreneurs' preferences or priorities, it is equally valid and perhaps less 
misleading to assume that they reflect his informants' perceptions of their 
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situation. It would be a mistake, for example, to conclude that Nigerian entrepre-
neurs are indifferent to profit, or that they place family interests ahead of indi• 
victual ones: other studies have clearly shown their interest in making money and, 
as we shall see, their approach to the business of earning a living is in some ways 
more individualistic than that of their Western counterparts. Rather, I think it 
reflects a keen awareness of the structure of economic opportunities in contem-
porary Nigerian society. The avenues to wealth and power in Nigeria run not 
through the informal sector, where opportunities for upward economic and social 
mobility are pretty limited, but through the public and large-scale private sectors 
to which education is a necessary, though no longer a sufficient, condition of 
access. Consequently, the tendency of low income families in both rural and 
urban areas to put a substantial proportion of their assets into the education of 
their children is perfectly consistent with a desire to maximize income in the 
long run for themselves and their offspring. There is little to be gained by pre-
serving a L20-a-year tailoring "business" for one's children to divide! The 
individualistic calculus which underlies this process is reflected in, for example, 
the common view that a parent has fulfilled his/her duty to the children by educa-
tine ~ of them; thereafter it is that child's responsibility to care for his/her 
siblings. As an informant once expressed it to me: "When my son has finished 
secondary school, I shall take another wife and enjoy myself. Why should I 
leave money after I die for someone else to chop?" 
In short, there is no evidence that obligations to family weaken the profit 
motive in Nigeria any more than they do in the United States. There is, however, 
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evidence that kinship and similar institutions do influence the organization of pro-
ductive activity, especially in the informal sector. This assertion requires some 
explanation, for it appears to fly in the face of some well-documented conclusions. 
Specifically, most of the studies of small-scale enterprise cited above show that 
few entrepreneurs rely significantly on family members for help in financing their 
businesses, The most important source of initial capital for small enterprise is 
the entrepreneur's own savings; gifts or loans from relatives are mentioned less 
frequently and, when they are, make up a much smaller proportion of total initial 
capital. In addition, few African enterprises have devised successful mechanisms 
for sharing or delegating financial responsibility--and kinsmen are particularly 
singled out as untrustworthy (Marris and Somerset, 1971). In short, relatives 
contribute little to financing or managing the business, but expect the proprietor 
to support them from his/her profits. If we take the firm as the fundamental unit 
of analysis, this evidence appears to justify the view that family obligations impede 
economic expansion, whether or not the entrepreneurs see it that way (cf. Nafziger, 
1969). 
If, on the other hand, we view entrepreneurs as individuals who draw on a 
variety of institutions for different kinds of economic functions, our conclusions 
may be different, Kinship and community affiliations may, for example, provide 
organizational mechanisms for solving certain managerial problems, such as re-
cruitment and supervision of labor, sharing of collective facilities, acquisition of 
information and mobilization of credit- -in the form of claims on productive ser-
vices rather than monetary assets, In a survey of twelve hundred craftsmen in 
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Thadan, for example, Michael Koll (1969) found that groups of craftsmen often 
associate ad hoc or permanently to share certain things 
or to do certain things together, without abandoning their 
economic independence ...• Since recruitment into a craft 
is no longer through kinship, such partnerships are 
apparently of a contractual nature; but in fact they have 
more in common with kinship relations than with typical 
contractual relations, since prospective partners take 
years to judge each other's moral behavior and techni-
cal skills; once established, the partnerships rest on 
mutual trust and understanding rather than on formali-
ties (p. 57). 
In this case, the principles of kin relations have been extended to certain features 
of organizing production, even though the individuals involved were not actually 
related to one another. Similarly, Abner Cohen (1969) has shown how Hausa 
cattle and kola traders have used ethnicity and religious affiliation to facilitate 
the exchange of market information and the supervision of commercial agents 
over long distances, in some cases creating such ties where they have not pre" 
viously existed. Similar conclusions have been reached in studies of agricultural 
and commercial expansion in the past (Baier, 1974; Berry, 1975; Cruise O'Brien, 
1971; Parkin, 1972). 
To the extent that participation in kinship, community, ethnic or religious 
networks permits individuals to draw on the economic resources of the group, it 
serves to reduce financial constraints on their activities--whether or not their 
claims are expressed in monetary terms. In some cases such contacts serve to 
facilitate business expansion--as when relatives or neighbors assist an entrepre-
neur to secure customers or advantageous contacts with suppliers; in others, they 
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provide a fall-back position in periods of economic misfortune and, in this sense, 
do constitute a kind of insurance or social security system. These considerations 
help not only to explain why African entrepreneurs often spend considerable sums 
for social or ceremonial purposes, but also to clarify their changing position in 
the aggregate structure of African economic life. 
Recent literature on contemporary patterns of African economic growth has 
provided considerable evidence of increasing inequality in the distribution of in-
come and wealth. In their search for greater economic independence, African 
governments have frequently embarked on policies of import-substituting indus-
trialization which tend to subsidize large-scale, capital-intensive, urban indus-
trial investment at the expense of agriculture and small-scale industry (for 
example, Berry, 1976). The result has often been, ironically, to increase African 
economies' dependence on foreign capital, technology, and markets, and at the 
same time to increase sectoral imbalance and income inequality at home. As 
Leys pointed out in the case of Kenya, insofar as the people who design and imple-
ment development strategy are also the chief beneficiaries of the resulting inegali-
tarian pattern of growth, policies are not likely to change in a fundamental way un-
less the poor are able to mount some form of effective protest. 
The chief impact of urban-biased, inegalitarian growth on small-scale enter-
prise is to reduce the prospects for expanding the scale of productive units. I 
tend to disagree with Steel's conclusion that the growth of the intermediate sector 
is primarily a function of urbanization, particularly in West Africa where the 
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growth of "cash markets''. long antedates that of most twentieth century cities. 
Indeed, I suspect that had he included commerce, transport, and construction 
(not to mention agricultural production for the market) in his inventory of 
"intermediate" sector firms, he might well have found as high an incidence of 
such enterprises in the cocoa farming villages as in Accra. 
Instead, I would argue on the basis of evidence cited above, that the expan-
sion of the "intermediate" sector is most likely to be stimulated by increases in 
aggregate income which are fairly widely distributed among the consuming popu-
lation. Relatively egalitarian growth tends to promote both final and intermediate 
demand for commodities and services produced in small-scale, labor-intensive 
units (Liedholm and Chuta, 1976; Berry, 1975; Hopkins, 1973). Conversely, 
to the extent that the benefits of African economic growth have been increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of an urban-based elite in recent years, the opportunities 
for increasing productivity and incomes in the small-scale sector may well have 
been contracting. More generally, there is increasing evidence that the proba-
bilities of Africans moving out of lower income strata are beginning to decline. 
Not only are there indications of a hardening of divisions among economic 
strata in contemporary Africa but, as in the case of small-scale entrepreneurs 
cited above, studies of low income Africans' perceptions of their chances of life-
time upward mobility also suggest that they are well aware of the odds against 
them (Lloyd, 1974; Gutkind, 1974). 
Faced with declining opportunities for upward socioeconomic mobility, poor 
Africans often react not only by economizing, as studies of the efficiency of very 
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small firms suggest, · but also by attempting to diversify their options--both 
economically and institutionally. Economically, they may seek to maintain 
or engage in more than one form of income-earning activity, or move frequently 
among occupations to take advantage of transitory opportunities to earn a little 
more. Thus, the rural exodus in many African societies is often counterbalanced 
by considerable movement back into rural areas, both by people who seek to in-
vest savings from urban employment in a farm and by those who need to recover 
their urban losses or escape unemployment by returning to the farm (Berry, 1975; 
Amin, 1973; cf. Lipton, et al., 1974). In short, there appears to be a growing 
tendency toward oscillatory migration between rural and urban areas: people 
move in and out of the city many times during their working lives. Similarly, 
many people combine agricultural and nonagricultural occupations--simultaneously, 
seasonally, or over time- -in an effort to increase their long-run earnings and, at 
the same time, reduce their vulnerability to the risks of a single venture (Marris 
and Somerset, 1971; Berry, 1975). Even urban wage earners in Africa are prone 
to "moonlight"--cultivating gardens, trading or engaging in a craft in their spare 
time--to make ends meet (Hart, 1973; Peil, 1972; Berry, 1975; Hinchliffe, 1974). 
Such a strategy of diversification does not necessarily reflect a decision to 
sacrifice income for security. Occupational diversification or mobility may 
serve to increase income in the short run, by enabling individuals to take advan-
tage of small fluctuations in relative returns to alternative activities, and 
18/ 
it may also increase one's chances of making good in the long-run by keeping 
open avenues of information and opportunity, one of which may eventually pay 
off. Education is perhaps the best example of this kind of economic strategy. 
Even though job opportunities for school leavers are not keeping pace with the 
supply, education remains a sine qua ~ for most really well-paying jobs. 
Thus, farmers, craftsmen, and petty traders, as well as modestly successful 
entrepreneurs, devote astonishingly high proportions of their incomes to paying 
school fees for their children, to give their kids as good a chance as they can 
afford at gaining access to the dwindling volume of new formal sector jobs. 
Similarly, poor Africans seek to maintain institutional affiliations which 
may prove useful either in times of luck or in case of disaster. Kinship, 
community, and other social ties which enable one to draw on others' assets 
(to launch an enterprise or avoid starvation) or assistance ( in finding a job, 
landing a contract, or burying a relative) increase one's ability both to cope 
with misfortune and to capitalize on opportunities for success. Thus, in the 
contemporary situation, kinship and ethnicity do not prevent small-scale entre-
preneurs from expanding their businesses; rather, entrepreneurs devote re-
sources to maintaining their ties to such institutions because opportunities for 
increasing their production and incomes are limited. Part of the attractiveness 
of education may be that it provides both economic and institutional assets: 
not only is schooling a necessary qualification for formal sector employment, 
but "old boy" (and girl) networks may help in obtaining a job when there are 
not enough to go around. 
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In short, it is an oversimplification to argue either that extended family 
networks, etc., merely provide security for players in the lottery of the urban 
job market, or that they offer effective channels of socioeconomic mobility 
which cut across socioeconomic strata and prevent the crystallization of con-
scious classes. In fact they do both, just as they can serve both to supply 
and to absorb resources for the individual entrepreneur. For those who have 
no wealthy or powerful relatives who can help them up the socioeconomic 
ladder, maintaining close ties with their kinsmen may be of crucial impor-
tance just to enable them to survive. Family, ethnic, and other "local" 
networks can cut across or work within (and hence reinforce) class lines: 
how productive they are; in terms of increasing the welfare of their mem-
bers in the long run, depends on where they stand in relation to the sources 
of wealth and power, and on how well organized they are. 
The implications of this discussion for assessing the prospects of small-
s cale enterprise, individually and in the aggregate, may be briefly stated. 
Without expanding markets and access to productive resources, small-scale 
firms cannot grow, no matter how carefully they are trained in accounting 
and supervisory techniques. Technical assistance without restructuring of in-
centives and a redistribution of income is not likely to "transform" the infor-
mal sector, any more than it has transformed agriculture. However, redis-
tribution of incomes or opportunities is politically unlikely--not only because of 
the vested interests of the haves, but also because the "survival" strategies of 
the have-nots tend to militate against organized class action from below. 
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